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Abstract

Recent literature has established that state tax revenues have grown significantly more
volatile relative to previous decades. Consequently, this is a growing concern for state
policymakers who increasingly need stable revenue sources to meet spending obligations. In this
paper, the consequences of comprehensive state tax reforms on subsequent tax revenue volatility
are studied using the reforms of Utah (2007) and North Carolina (2013) as case studies. Using a
synthetic control methodology, graphical evidence suggests that North Carolina’s tax reform
resulted in lower subsequent revenue volatility, but that Utah’s reform likely did not have such
an effect on revenue volatility.
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Summary

Recent literature has demonstrated that state tax revenue volatility has risen substantially
since the beginning of the 21st century (see Seegert 2016). This can be a substantial problem for
state governments that need stable sources of revenue to meet growing spending obligations
because they have limited means to borrow to cover spending deficits. The literature has
suggested that economic shocks are a primary determinant of revenue volatility, but so too is the
type of tax policy that a state implements. This paper primarily seeks to exploit recent major
state tax reforms in order to determine the effect that these policies had on the states’ subsequent
level of revenue volatility.

The two states studied in this paper, Utah and North Carolina, passed major tax reforms
in 2007 and 2013, respectively, with broadly similar policy goals. Both states lowered and/or
flattened rates of major taxes and reformed policies towards income tax deductions, credits, and
exemptions. Theory suggests that some of these policies would be likely to have a downward
causal effect on revenue volatility. This claim is tested using synthetic control models for both
states in order to determine the likely treatment effect that these reforms had on the subsequent
volatility of affected revenue sources in North Carolina and Utah. A synthetic control model is
essentially a modified difference in difference which compares pre- and post-treatment trends in
an outcome variable between a treatment and control case in order to estimate a treatment effect.
The control essentially acts as a counterfactual that can approximate what would have happened
to the treated case in the absence of a treatment. However, rather than the control being selected
in an ad hoc fashion based on its resemblance to the treatment case, a synthetic control is
selected in a data-driven manner as a weighted average of all available control units (in this case,
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states). Control units are weighted based on their resemblance to the treatment along various
predictor variables. The goal of this is to create a counterfactual that can more credibly
hypothesize what would have happened to the treatment case in the absence of a treatment, and
thus more accurately determine the treatment effect.

Using this methodology, I present five synthetic control models (three for North Carolina
and two for Utah) which plot the volatility of different revenue sources (individual income taxes,
corporate income taxes, and total taxes) for both the reforming state and its corresponding
synthetic control. The results of these models suggest that North Carolina’s tax reform likely had
a downward effect on future revenue volatility, as theory would predict. However, a similar
effect cannot be determined for Utah based on its synthetic control models, which show no
convincing graphical evidence for a causal effect. The reason for these different results could lie
in the timing of each of the reforms, as North Carolina implemented their reform in the middle of
an economic expansion while Utah implemented theirs in the middle of the Great Recession. In
addition, there could be policy reasons for the different results due to each state’s slightly
different treatment of the sales tax, as well as income tax deductions, credits, and exemptions.
Future research could more precisely determine the more subtle reasons for the results shown,
but the synthetic models implemented here show promise as an empirical tool for studying the
effects of tax policy on revenue volatility.
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Introduction

One of the chief concerns of state policymakers, especially in an environment of nearuniversal balanced budget requirements, is determining ways to generate sufficient and
predictable streams of revenue to reliably meet expected spending obligations. This is not
straightforward. Like the national economy, states are subject to larger macroeconomic shocks as
well as changing regional economic conditions that can affect their tax bases, and thereby their
revenue. This can result in financial hardship during difficult economic times if states are not
able to spend more than they take in and at the same time must meet obligations such as social
spending, debt service, and employee pensions. It is reasonable to assume that states would
prefer a predictable stream of revenue to a more volatile stream subject to the whims of the
market. If states are to orient their tax policy with this goal in mind, it is imperative that
policymakers understand the effects of previous instances of tax policy reform on the reforming
state’s subsequent revenue volatility. North Carolina’s 2013 and Utah’s 2007 tax reform both
offer such a case. Both states overhauled their respective tax codes, which included lowering
personal income tax rates, instituting a flat individual income tax rate (for Utah), and a flat
corporate income tax rate (for North Carolina). In this paper, I ask the question, “what were the
effects of this reform on subsequent volatility in revenues?” Using a synthetic control
methodology, I compare pre- and post-reform revenue and volatility trends of North Carolina
and Utah to their synthetic counterparts in order to isolate the marginal effect of the reforms on
volatility. Based on a review of the literature, this methodology is novel in the field of revenue
volatility studies and would thus make a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge on this
topic.
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In the following section, I briefly detail the historical context of both states’ reform
efforts as well as the major provisions of the reforms. Understanding the provisions of the
policies are important to understanding their likely effects on their states’ revenue volatility.
Both of the reforms moved their state towards a tax code (particularly on incomes) with lower
rates broader bases. Theory would suggest that, on first blush, these changes would lower the
volatility of revenues for two reasons. First, the shifting of tax rates which change the
composition of a state’s “tax portfolio” would be expected to similarly change the volatility of
that portfolio based on the inherent volatility of taxes being changed. In other words, if a state
becomes less reliant on a very volatile tax, then the state’s portfolio will necessarily be less
volatile. Income taxes, both individual and corporate, generate relatively volatile revenue streams
(Groves and Kahn, 1952), so one would expect a reform that lowers income tax rates (as was the
case for North Carolina and Utah) to lower their overall tax revenue volatility. Second, it is
possible that progressive rates for taxes on income make those revenues even more volatile
because shifts in income concentrated in high-income individuals or corporations cause the
subsequent shifts in revenue to be greater than they otherwise would. In other words, progressive
tax rates make income tax revenues more dependent on high-income individuals and income is
more volatile at the upper reaches of the income distribution. An income tax with a flat rate
might therefore be expected to exhibit lower volatility, other things equal.1

Though the focus of this research is in studying tax policy as it relates to revenue
volatility, it should be noted that taking this focus does not presume that the stability of revenues
is the only or even most important criteria in evaluating tax policies. Governments may also
consider adequacy, growth, or fairness in adopting tax policies and preferences vary depending

1

See Seegert (2013), which establishes a tradeoff between progressivity and revenue stability in state tax systems.
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on the context in which policies are being considered. In addition, there are always tradeoffs
between such criteria that generally keep governments from obtaining maximum amounts of
fairness, growth, stability in their policies. For example, revenue stability may come at the
expense of some standards of fairness because some relatively stable sources of revenue are also
relatively regressive (e.g. the sales tax). This paper will thus proceed focusing on revenue
volatility, but the omission of further discussion of other criteria does not denote a position that
revenue stability is necessarily the most important lens through which to judge tax policy.

The Tax Reforms of Utah and North Carolina

North Carolina

In some sense, North Carolina was ripe for a major tax reform as 2012 ended. The
November elections of that year had seen a Republican governor and Republican majorities in
the state House and Senate come to power at the same time for the first time in over a century,
and incoming Governor Pat McCrory had campaigned to reform the tax code, stating “[a]t a
minimum, I’d like to at least have our income tax and our corporate tax be competitive with our
neighboring states of South Carolina and Virginia” (Binker and Leslie, 2012). To the incoming
governing coalition, North Carolina’s tax code was outdated, a relic of its manufacturing
economy of the 1930s, with relatively high tax rates and large numbers of loopholes and
exemptions (Binker and Leslie, 2012). Indeed, by 2012 some of the state’s tax rates were quite
high when compared to the rest of the country; the top income tax rate was the 12th highest in
the nation at 7.75 percent while the lowest income tax rate was the highest bottom bracket rate in
the nation at 6 percent. Essentially, the Republican coalition planned to affect more or less the
entire tax code by lowering corporate and income tax rates, simplify the tax code for businesses,
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and broaden the sales tax base by eliminating exemptions and extending the sales tax to services
(Binker and Leslie, 2012).

The plan was not without opposition though; opponents of the proposal expressed equity
concerns, arguing that the reform could end up being regressive by shifting more of the tax
burden to lower-income households via an expanded sales tax base and 3 reduced income tax
exemptions. Opponents were also skeptical of its ability to strengthen the state’s economic
competitiveness and lead to greater job creation. The final vote suggested that these concerns
were not quelled, as HB 998 (named the Tax Simplification and Reduction Act) passed the
House and Senate almost completely along party lines (North Carolina General Assembly,
2013).

The key provisions of the Tax Simplification and Reduction Act related to individual and
corporate income taxation will be covered here. First and foremost, the reform significantly
reduced the rates at which individual and corporate income was taxed, replacing the previous
three individual income brackets of 6, 7, and 7.75 percent with a flat rate of 5.8 in 2014 , and
gradually lowering the corporate income rate from 6.9 percent to 6 percent in 2014, 5 percent in
2015, and possibly 3 percent by 2017 conditional on the state meeting prescribed revenue
targets.2 The bill also revised provisions of the tax code on exemptions, credits, and deductions.
For example, it eliminated personal exemptions (a standard deduction from taxable income
claimed on a per-person basis), capped the combined deduction on mortgage interest and
property taxes that itemizers could take at $20,000; eliminated various credits for child care,
disability, education expenses, and charitable contributions for non-itemizers, and eliminated a

2

Revenue targets were met and the corporate income tax rate is currently 3 percent.

10

deduction for government and private retirement income (Binker, 2013). It eliminated a
deduction for personal business income in which individuals could deduct up to $50,000 of
business earnings that counted against their personal taxes. A legislative analysis estimated that
“60 percent of individual tax returns with business income that qualifies for the $50K business
income deduction would see a tax increase” (Binker, 2013). The bill partially offset the
elimination of these exemptions and credits by raising the standard deduction3 for all filers and
the child tax credit for households with incomes below $40,000.

The revisions to the corporate income tax were similar but less extensive. In addition to
lowering the tax rate, the bill allowed a number of business tax credits to expire, including the
film production tax credit and various credits aimed at attracting businesses to the state.

Utah

Utah enacted its tax reform over their 2006 and 2007 legislative sessions. Pre-reform,
Utah’s tax system was in a different position than that of pre-reform North Carolina. While
North Carolina was viewed as having a generally inefficient and burdensome tax system, Utah
already had a relatively “business-friendly” tax structure, ranking 18th in the Tax Foundation’s
State Business Tax Climate Index in 2006 (Tax Foundation, 2018).
Over the 2006-2007 legislative sessions, Utah enacted major changes to the state’s
individual income tax and sales tax. Prior to the reform, Utah had a progressive, six bracket
income tax with rates ranging from 2.3 to 7 percent. The reform replaced the progressive system
with a single flat rate of 5.35 percent for all filers in 2007, lowering it to 5 percent in 2008. The

3

For example, the standard deduction for married couples filing jointly increased from $6,000 to $15,000.
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initial reform from the 2006 session made the flat-rate system optional for one year because
some filers would have actually seen a tax increase under the new system. Changes to the sales
tax were less dramatic. The general sales tax rate was lowered from 4.75 to 4.65 and the sales tax
rate on food was lowered to 1.75 percent, resulting in a net decrease in sales tax revenue of
approximately $80 million (Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 2007). In
addition to lowering rates, Utah changed its treatment of deductions, exemptions, and credits,
replacing its standard deduction, allowance for personal exemptions, and deduction for
retirement income with credits which phase out as income increases (Cornia, Johnson, and
Nelson 2017)

Literature Review
The following section will give a brief background on important theoretical and empirical
concepts that inform this study, as well as the work that has developed these concepts. To this
end, I will first briefly review the literature on the income elasticities of tax revenues, which is
essential to understanding revenue volatility. Previous work on this is rather extensive, so this
review will not be exhaustive. Following this, I will give a brief overview of the literature on tax
revenue volatility in relation to the revenue diversification hypothesis, which is important
because a large portion of the scholarship on tax revenue volatility has used the revenue
diversification hypothesis as its raison d'être. I will then review other important work on tax
revenue volatility that does not study the revenue diversification hypothesis. Finally, I will
review the literature on synthetic control, the empirical methodology I use in this research.
Income Elasticity of Tax Revenue
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Central to understanding the volatility and variability of a tax revenue stream is
understanding its elasticity with respect to income.4 Elasticity in this context can be defined as
the ratio of the percentage change in tax revenue to a given percentage change in income. This
can be more informally thought of as the degree to which a tax revenue stream is sensitive to
changes in income or economic activity. Taxes with an income elasticity greater than one are
income elastic, meaning that a one percent increase in income results in a greater than one
percent increase in revenue. Taxes with an income elasticity less than one are income inelastic,
meaning that a one percent increase in income results in a less than one percent increase in
revenue. Given this framework, taxes that are relatively income inelastic are more stable because
they are less sensitive to changes in economic conditions, while elastic taxes are relatively
volatile because they are more sensitive to changes in economic conditions. Understanding the
volatility of a government’s tax revenues is therefore closely related to understanding the income
elasticities of the taxes in its tax portfolio. The seminal study in this area by Groves and Kahn
(1952), posited that the stability of tax revenue streams is a function of their income elasticity.
However, because of this there is necessarily a tradeoff between the stability and potential for
growth in revenues because more income elastic taxes, though they are less stable, increase
disproportionately to increases in income and may grow rapidly. In the study, taxes with low
income elasticity included the property tax and various excise taxes such as the motor fuel tax
and cigarette tax, while taxes with medium to high income elasticity included the sales tax and
individual income tax. Work following this has largely expanded up this by seeking to
understand the long and short term dynamics of the income elasticity of tax bases (e.g. Bruce,

4

In this context, income may be synonymous with GDP or some other indicator of economic output.
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Fox, and Tuttle 2006, Sobel and Holcombe 1996) as well as dynamics of specific taxes, such as
Fox and Cambell’s (1984) study which examined the stability of state sales tax revenues.
Revenue Diversification Hypothesis
Much of the work in the public finance literature has hypothesized a different (though not
mutually exclusive) explanation for the level of revenue volatility in a government’s overall
revenue stream: revenue source diversification. The theory is essentially that governments
diversify their tax “portfolio” in order to stabilize their revenue streams from year to year in the
same way that investors in the stock market diversify their portfolio in order to reduce risk. Early
studies examining this question generally found a negative relationship between diversification
and volatility. Misiolek and Elder (1988) were among the first to find significant evidence of a
negative relationship between revenue diversification and volatility. More recent work looked at
municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan region and showed similar results (Hendrick 2002).
The recession resulting from the 2008 financial crisis spurred additional research on the question,
as state and local governments were forced to cope with severe revenue shortfalls. Jordan and
Wagner (2008) studied revenue diversification in Arkansas cities over a 10-year period and
found that revenue diversification can mitigate severe revenue fluctuations. Though his work
doesn’t deal directly with the revenue diversification hypothesis, Nathan Seegert’s work has
studied state taxation from the context of tax “portfolios”, finding that the riskiness of a state’s
tax portfolio, determined by the mix of taxes that make up a state’s revenue stream, significantly
affects the volatility of revenues (Seegert 2015).5
Synthetic Control

5

Other work by Seegert (Seegert 2016) deals extensively with state tax revenue volatility and informs aspects of
this paper’s empirical strategy.
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Before moving on, a brief overview of the existing literature on synthetic control (the
empirical methodology of this study) should be given. Synthetic control, first developed by
Abadie and Gardeazabol (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), has been called
“arguably the most important innovation in the policy evaluation literature in the last 15 years”
(Athey and Imbens, 2017, 9). It functions similarly to difference in differences in that
applications of the method are quasi-experimental and the causal effect of a policy intervention is
hypothesized based on a comparison of trends of an outcome variable for a control and treated
unit. Difference in difference studies generally compare trends in an outcome variable between
the treated unit (often a city, state, region, country, etc.) and a comparable unit which exhibits
parallel trends in the outcome variable in the pre-treatment. Card’s (1990) seminal study of the
effects of a wave of Cuban immigration to Miami on the city’s labor market is a good example of
this, which compared the trends in various labor market indicators in Miami and comparable
cities in the pre- and post-immigration period, finding that the wave of immigration had
“essentially no effect on the wages or employment outcomes of non-Cuban workers in the Miami
labor market” (Card, 1990, 255). This approach is particularly strong and causally valid if the
treated and control unit are reasonably similar and the outcome variable(s) display parallel trends
in the pre-treatment period. The synthetic control method functions similarly to this, but the
control unit is generated based on a “weighted average of the available control units” that most
closely match the pre-treatment trends of the treated unit (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller,
2010, 494). It is a strong alternative to difference in differences when “no single untreated unit
provides a good comparison for the unit affected by the treatment or event of interest” (Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2014, 500). This method has most notably been utilized to estimate
the effect of California’s Proposition 99 on cigarette consumption (Abadie, Diamond, and
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Hainmueller, 2010), that of conflict in the Basque region of Spain on its economic outcomes
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), and the effect of German reunification on West Germany’s
economy (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010). This method is relatively new, but it has
been widely used in a number of case studies which examine the effects of major policy
interventions or events on large jurisdictions for which macro-level data is available [see:
(Rieger, Wagner, and Bedi, 2017), (Barlow, 2017), and (Munasib and Rickman, 2015)].
Data Collection and Research Design
Data Collection
I gathered yearly data on tax revenues, tax rates, economic variables, and population for
all 50 states between 1980 and 2017. I collected data on tax revenues between 2002 and 2017
from the Census Bureau’s Census of State and Local Government and data on tax rates from the
same years from the Council of State Government’s yearly Book of the States. Tax rate and
revenue data from 1980 to 2001 was collected from the World Tax Database of the University of
Michigan’s Office of Tax Policy Research. Tax rates collected included the top and bottom
individual income tax rate, the top corporate income tax rate, and the general sales tax rate.
Revenue sources collected were general sales tax revenue, individual income tax revenue,
corporate income tax revenue, and total tax revenue. No individual state tax revenue data exists
for the year 2003, so all revenue data for this year in my panel data set were interpolated based
on a simple linear time trend.
Economic variables and population figures were gathered from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. I collected yearly state GDP and personal income data for all states between 1980 and
2017. Nominal dollar figures for tax revenues, state GDP, personal income are deflated to 2012
dollars in order to make results comparable across time.
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In addition to this economic data, I use the State Coincident Index, a monthly economic
indicator produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The index combines monthly
nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers,
the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index
in order to summarize current economic conditions (Federal Reserve of Philadelphia 2020). The
indicator is similarly utilized as an economic indicator in another tax revenue volatility study
(Seegert 2016) and is thus used in this model. As it is a monthly indicator, the 12 monthly values
in a given state and year are averaged to produce a yearly value for each state from 1980 to 2017.
Measuring Volatility
In this research, volatility will be calculated using the “squared residual” measure. 6 The
measure, detailed below, for a given state and year is simply the square root of the squared
residual from a state-specific time trend.
𝜌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 = √𝜀𝑖𝑡2
𝜌 in this measure is the total yearly revenues by source. The squared residual is a more
conservative measure of volatility than a simple year over year change [(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1 )/𝑥𝑡−1 )]
because it nets out state-specific time trends that would otherwise be included in a year over year
measure of volatility. In order to produce state specific time trends for a given measure of
revenue (i.e. income tax revenue, corporate tax revenue, total tax revenue, etc.), the measure of
revenue for a given source of revenue was regressed on time from 1980 to 2017 to create
predicted values for each state and year. The residual was then calculated by subtracting actual
yearly revenues for a given state and year from the predicted value. The treated states, North

6

This measure was originally used in Seegert (2016)
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Carolina and Utah, were treated differently than the control states in that two time trends were
calculated for them, a pre- and post-reform trend, in order to account for the revenue effects the
reform may have had. In other words, changing the tax rates can be expected to have substantial
effects on the absolute value of tax revenues, however the post-reform revenues may be more or
less volatile based on the predicted values of post-reform revenues.
Measuring Tax Revenues
Total tax revenues for a given state and year in this study are measured as the sum of
individual income tax revenues, corporate income tax revenues, and general sales tax revenues.
Similarly used in Seegert (2016), the purpose of this measure is to make revenue figures more
comparable across states due to the “large differences in the importance of oil and mineral
revenues across states, and differences in property assessments [which] make it impossible to
compare property tax rates” (Seegert 2016).
Research Design
As briefly described earlier, the synthetic control method used in this this report is a similar
to a difference in difference in that the pre- and post-treatment trends are compared between a
treatment case (Utah and North Carolina) and a control case (in this case, the “synthetic
control”). More formally, if we seek to know the treatment effect of some policy intervention
using a difference in difference methodology, we obtain the effect through the following
operation: (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) − (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑒 ) where each term
is the pre- or post-treatment average of the outcome variable that captures the effect of the policy
intervention 7. In this case, the outcome variable is revenue volatility, calculated as the squared
residual from a state-specific time trend. With the synthetic control methodology, though we still

7

We also must assume that, in the absence of reform, the treatment and control case exhibit parallel trends in the
outcome variable in the post-treatment periods.
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calculate the treatment effect of the policy intervention by differencing the differences between
the treatment and control average values of the outcome variable in the pre- and post- period, the
outcome variable of our control unit is a “synthetic” construction, a weighted average of all
available control units that optimally resembles the treated unit in all relevant characteristics
(predictor variables) in the pre-treatment period. In the synthetic control model, all weights
assigned to available control units (or “donor pool” (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2011))
are greater than or equal to zero and the sum of all weights are equal to one. In this research, the
available control are all states besides either Utah or North Carolina and the predictor variables
upon which the weights assigned to the donor pool are determined are tax rates, economic
variables, and volatility measures in the pre-treatment period. The purpose of the predictor
variables and weights assigned to the donor pool are to recreate to come as close as possible to
the values of the treatment unit’s outcome variable and predictor variables in the pre-treatment
period so that the synthetic control can be a credible counterfactual to the treated case in the
post-treatment period.
In this study, multiple synthetic control models are run for each state. Because both states
made substantial changes to their personal and/or corporate income tax systems, I am interested
in how those reforms affected the volatility of those individual revenue sources in addition to
what I define as total tax revenues. Because of that, I run three synthetic control models for
North Carolina and two for Utah. For North Carolina, there is one for total tax revenues, one for
corporate income tax revenues, and one for individual income tax revenues. For Utah, there is
one for total tax revenues and one for individual income tax revenues, but none for corporate
income tax revenues because their 2007 reform did not make substantial changes to the corporate
income tax code.
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Predictor variables chosen for each synthetic control model depend on the type of tax (or
taxes) that the revenue source entails. In general, each synthetic control contains predictor
variables on tax system characteristics and state economic conditions in order to synthesize a
“state” that most resembles the treatment state. For the total tax revenue model, the predictor
variables are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Predictor Variables for Total Tax Revenue Model
Predictor Variable
Notes
Top Individual Income Tax Rate
Bottom Individual Income Tax Rate
Sales Tax Rate
Top Corporate Income Tax Rate
Has Individual Income Tax
Has Sales Tax
Dummy variables with a value of 1 if the state has that
Has Individual Income Tax
tax
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the state is in the
same Census-designated region (North, South,
Midwest, or West)

Region
Log(GDP Per Person)
Log(Personal Income Per Person)
Coincident Index
Residual Trend (Year)

Value of the residual trend volatility measure for the
revenue source in question

The predictor variables for the corporate income tax model and the individual income tax model
are given in the following table.
Table 2: Predictor Variables for Individual and Corporate
Income Tax Revenue Models
Predictor Variables
Individual Income Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Top Individual Income Tax Rate
Top Corporate Income Tax Rate
Bottom Individual Income Tax Rate
Has Individual Income Tax
Has Corporate Income Tax
Region
Region
Log(GDP Per Person)
Log(GDP Per Person)
Log(Personal Income Per Person)
Log(Personal Income Per Person)
Coincident Index
Coincident Index
Residual Trend (Year)

Residual Trend (Year)
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In all three of these models, the same kinds of predictor variables are included in the synthetic
control model in order to generate a “synthetic” North Carolina or Utah. In order to generate a
synthetic control with similar economic conditions to the treated states in the pre-treatment
period, the natural logarithms of GDP per capita and personal income per capita, as well as the
yearly average of the state coincident index are inserted in the synthetic control. The indicator
variable of region is inserted in the model so that states in the same region as the treated state are
given extra weight in the final synthetic control. This is done in order to control for regional
economic, political, and social factors that may influence the revenue volatility of the treated
state. In addition, in order to give appropriate weights to states in the donor pool, states are
selected based on how similar their tax system is to that of the treated state. The predictor
variables that capture these factors are tax rates and the “Has [tax]” indicator variables, so that
states are given weight based on how similar their tax rates are to the treated state and whether or
not they have the tax (or taxes) in question. Finally, values of the residual trend volatility
measure in each of the three years leading up to the reform are included as predictor variables in
order to select for states that exhibit similar pre-reform trends in the revenue volatility of the tax
in question. With these predictor variables, it is more likely that a credible counterfactual to the
treated states can be generated because the synthetic control is a weighted average of states with
similar tax system characteristics, as well as economic and regional characteristics.
Results
In the following section, I present results for each of the five synthetic control models I
run for North Carolina and Utah. For each synthetic control model, I will present pre-treatment
means for the predictor variables of the synthetic and treated state in order to establish whether
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or not the synthetic control closely tracks the treated state along the lines of the predictor
variables. I will also display the weights given to states based on the synthetic control model in
question. Finally, I will display a graph showing the pre- and post-treatment trends of revenue
volatility for the treated state and its synthetic counterpart, followed by a brief interpretation of
results.
North Carolina
Individual Income Tax
Table 3: Synthetic Control State Weights and Pre-Reform Predictor Variable Means
State
Delaware
Louisiana
Minnesota
Mississippi

Unit Weight
0.164
0.29
0.206
0.34

Predictor Variable
Top Income Tax Rate
Bottom Income Tax Rate
South
Log(GDP Per Person)

Treated
7.447
5.933
1
10.727

Synthetic
6.188
3.004
0.794
10.715

Log(Personal Income Per Person)
Coincident Index
Residual Trend (2011)
Residual Trend (2012)

10.527
101.035
0.104
0.098

10.529
100.818
0.109
0.096

0.074

0.053

Residual Trend (2013)

The synthetic control for the volatility of North Carolina’s individual income tax revenue
is modeled as the weighted average of four states: Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, and
Mississippi. Mississippi and Louisiana were given the most weight based on the synthetic control
models. As can be seen above, the pre-treatment means of the predictor variables of the synthetic
control for the most part closely reflect those of North Carolina, particularly those of the
economic predictor variables and the values of the volatility measures in the three years leading
up to the reform. The figure below plots the annual values of the squared residual volatility
measure for North Carolina and its synthetic counterpart from 2000 to 2017. The two cases
follow parallel trends in the years leading up to the reform, especially from 2006 to 2013, which
lends to the validity of the model. Most importantly however, the two states diverge sharply in
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their revenue volatility in the years following the reform; the real North Carolina’s income tax
revenue volatility drops sharply after the reform while the same volatility measure for the
synthetic control sees no such fall in volatility. In 2014 (the first post-reform year), the volatility
of North Carolina’s income tax revenues drops to roughly a 2% deviation from the time trend,
while that of the synthetic North Carolina rises to about a 7.5% deviation. That the revenue
volatility of income tax revenues for North Carolina and the synthetic control display parallel
pre-reform trends and a sharp divergence after the reform is evidence that the changes made to
North Carolina’s income tax system had a downward causal effect on the revenue source’s
volatility in the years subsequent to the reform.
Figure 1: Individual Income Tax Revenue Volatility for North Carolina and Synthetic Control

8

Corporate Income Tax

8

The vertical dotted line is marked at 2014, the first post-reform year.
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Table 4: Synthetic Control State Weights and Pre-Reform Predictor Variable Means
State
Alabama
Arkansas
Delaware
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
South Dakota
Virginia

Unit Weight
0.147
0.131
0.307
0.011
0.085
0.239
0.01
0.069

Predictor Variable
Log(GDP Per Person)
Log(Personal Income Per Person)
Coincident Index
South
Top Corporate Tax Rate
Has Corporate Tax
Residual Trend (2011)
Residual Trend (2012)
Residual Trend (2013)

Treated
10.716
10.509
95.393
1
6.836
1
0.191
0.103

Synthetic
10.705
10.498
95.295
0.989
6.817
0.999
0.189
0.102

0.079

0.079

The synthetic control for the volatility of North Carolina’s pre-2014 corporate income tax
revenues is modeled as a weighted average of eight states, with two states (Delaware and
Mississippi) making up just over half of the total weight. The pre-treatment means of the
predictor variables for North Carolina and the synthetic control are similar, which is evidence
that the synthetic control is a credible counterfactual for North Carolina. However, as can be
seen in the graph below which plots the volatility of corporate income tax revenues for North
Carolina and its synthetic counterpart, the pre-2011 trends for North Carolina and the synthetic
control do not generally move parallel to one another, which may raise concern that the synthetic
control isn’t a credible counterfactual. Nevertheless, the values of the volatility measure in the
three years leading up to the reform are nearly identical between North Carolina and the
synthetic control, which is evidence that the synthetic control meets the parallel trends
assumption. Similar to the synthetic control model for individual income tax revenues, North
Carolina and the synthetic control see a sharp divergence in the volatility of their corporate
income tax revenues in the years following the reform. The volatility of revenues for North
Carolina stabilizes around a 10% deviation from the time trend, while the volatility of the
synthetic control unit’s revenues rises sharply in the post-reform years. However, as can be seen
in Figure A.2 in Appendix A, the linear time trend for corporate income tax revenues after the
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reform is actually negative due to the revenue effects of the lower rates. This decline in volatility
is thus not necessarily positive if the revenue growth is the criteria for the success of the policy
because revenues in this case merely decline steadily rather than grow steadily.
Figure 2: Corporate Income Tax Revenue Volatility for North Carolina and Synthetic Control

Total Tax Revenue
Table 5: Synthetic Control State Weights and Pre-Reform Predictor Variable Means
State
West Virginia
New York
North Dakota
Mississippi
Oregon
Arkansas
South Carolina
Louisiana

Unit Weight
0.302
0.239
0.228
0.124
0.07
0.014
0.013
0.011

Predictor Variable
Top Income Tax Rate
Bottom Income Tax Rate
Sales Tax Rate
Top Corporate Tax Rate
Has Corporate Tax
Has Sales Tax
Has Income Tax
South

Treated
7.447
5.933
4.639
6.317
1
1
1
1

Synthetic
6.715
3.067
4.981
7.143
1.001
0.931
1.001
0.464

Log(GDP Per Person)
Log(Personal Income Per Person)
Coincident Index
Residual Trend (2011)
Residual Trend (2012)

10.727
10.527
101.035
0.052
0.097

10.713
10.573
100.186
0.056
0.082

0.094

0.094

Residual Trend (2013)
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The synthetic control for the volatility of North Carolina’s pre-reform total tax revenues
(defined as the sum of income, corporate, and sales tax) is modeled as a weighted average of
eight states, with West Virginia and New York being the two most heavily weighted states. The
synthetic control matches or comes close to matching the pre-reform means of North Carolina’s
predictor variable values, though there are a few exceptions. For example, the synthetic control’s
bottom individual income tax rate is nearly three percentage points lower than that of North
Carolina and the absolute difference between the top and bottom income tax rate is roughly two
percentage points greater than it is for North Carolina in the pre-reform years, indicating that the
synthetic control’s pre-reform income tax structure is more progressive than that of North
Carolina. In addition, three out of eight states that comprise the weighted average of the synthetic
control are in a different region than North Carolina, which may bias the synthetic control based
on regional economic or political effects that North Carolina is not subject to. Nevertheless, the
volatility measure of North Carolina and the synthetic control follow parallel trends, particularly
in the three years leading up the reform, which is evidence that the synthetic control may be a
strong counterfactual. Similar to the results from the previous two models, North Carolina and its
synthetic control experience a sharp divergence in the volatility of their respective tax revenues
in the post-reform years, with the volatility of North Carolina’s total tax revenues experiencing a
sharp decline compared to that of the synthetic control. Again, this is evidence that North
Carolina’s tax reform had a downward causal effect on the volatility of the state’s tax revenues.
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Figure 3: Total Tax Revenue Volatility for North Carolina and Synthetic Control

Utah
Individual Income Tax
Table 6: Synthetic Control State Weights and Pre-Reform Predictor Variable Means
State
Montana
Oregon
Idaho
Arizona
Texas

Unit Weight
0.349
0.263
0.238
0.101
0.05

Predictor Variables
Top Income Tax Rate
Bottom Income Tax Rate
Has Income Tax
West
Log(GDP Per Person)

Treated
7.00
2.3
1
1
10.651

Synthetic
8.04
2.66
0.951
0.951
10.577

Log(Personal Income Per Person)
Coincident Index
Residual Trend (2005)
Residual Trend (2006)

10.386
85.166
0.039
0.069

10.446
88.790
0.048
0.073

Residual Trend (2007)

0.123

0.106

The synthetic control for the volatility of Utah’s income tax revenue is modeled as the
weighted average of five states, with Montana and Oregon making up over half of the total
weight. For the most part, the pre-reform means of the predictor variables for Utah and its
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synthetic control are close to one another, strengthening evidence that the synthetic Utah is a
believable counterfactual. In addition, the volatility measures of both cases follow nearly parallel
trends in the pre-reform period, especially after 2003. However, unlike the same model for North
Carolina, there does not appear to be strong visual evidence for a causal effect of Utah’s tax
reform on the subsequent volatility of its individual income tax revenues. Though the volatility
of Utah’s income tax revenues spike relative to its synthetic control in 2008, the first post-reform
year, the two follow parallel trends in the 3 following years, suggesting that the reform didn’t
have a significant effect on Utah’s income tax revenue volatility. Though Utah’s volatility drops
relative to its synthetic counterpart in the last 4 years, the difference is not sufficiently wide that
statistical noise can be ruled out. Based on the graphical evidence, a clear causal effect of Utah’s
reform on subsequent volatility cannot be determined
Figure 4: Individual Income Tax Revenue Volatility for Utah and Synthetic Control

9

9

The vertical dotted line is marked at 2008, the first post-reform year.
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Total Tax Revenue
Table 7: Synthetic Control State Weights and Pre-Reform Predictor Variable Means
State
Idaho
New Mexico
Colorado
Washington
Oregon
Arizona

Unit Weight
0.571
0.173
0.092
0.086
0.067
0.011

Predictor Variables
Has Sales Tax
Has Corporate Tax
Has Income Tax
Log(GDP Per Person)
Log(Personal Income
Per Person)

Treated
1
1
1
10.651

Synthetic
0.933
0.914
0.914
10.609

10.386

10.451

West
Coincident Index
Top Income Tax Rate
Bottom Income Tax
Rate
Top Corporate Tax
Rate
Sales Tax Rate
Residual Trend (2005)
Residual Trend (2006)

1
85.166
6.998

1
88.144
6.783

2.3

2.058

5
4.75
0.046
0.063

6.658
4.822
0.074
0.068

Residual Trend (2007)

0.091

0.081

The synthetic control for the volatility of Utah’s pre-reform total tax revenues (defined as
the sum of income, corporate, and sales tax) is modeled as a weighted average of six states, all
from the same region as Utah, with Idaho and New Mexico being the two most heavily weighted
states. Though the pre-reform means of the predictor variables are quite similar between Utah
and the synthetic control, the volatility measure of the two (as seen in the graph below) often do
not follow parallel trends in the years leading up to the reform. This does not lend itself to the
validity of the model, as pre-treatment parallel trends are an essential condition of the causal
validity of a difference in difference model such as this. The volatility trends of Utah and the
synthetic control post-reform are similarly “noisy”; though Utah sees a sharp increase in
volatility (relative to the control) in the first year after the tax reform, it dips below that of the
control in the years following, though the difference between the two shrinks with time.
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Similarly to Utah’s income tax model, the graphical evidence does not point towards any
probable causal effect in this case.
Figure 5: Total Tax Revenue Volatility for Utah and Synthetic Control

Discussion and Conclusion
The results seem to beg the question: why did broadly similar tax reforms in North
Carolina and Utah not have the same effects on the volatility of subsequent revenues? For
example, the volatility of individual income tax revenues dropped sharply in North Carolina after
the reform (relative to the synthetic control), but those of Utah initially rose sharply before
stabilizing at a lower level in subsequent years. The most likely explanation could be the timing
of each of the reforms. The Utah tax reform was implemented in 2008, the first year of the Great
Recession, while North Carolina’s was implemented in 2014, in the middle of one of the longest
periods of economic expansions in American history. Given that changes in economic conditions
are a key determinant of the tax revenue volatility (Seegert 2016), different changes could
interact differently with generally similar tax reforms to produce varied effects on subsequent
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revenue volatility. This cause additionally cannot be ruled out because the difference in results
between North Carolina and Utah is not so great that a major policy difference between the two
reforms would be significantly more likely to explain the results. In general, most of the models
show that volatility in the reforming states drops in the post-reform years, though in the case of
Utah the reform cannot likely explain the drop because the revenue volatility of its synthetic
counterpart behaves similarly in the post-reform period. Though the different economic contexts
in which North Carolina and Utah adopted their reforms may explain their different results,
differences in their respective policies also cannot be ruled out as explanations.
Though Utah and North Carolina adhered to broadly similar guiding principles in their
reform efforts (i.e. lower, flatter tax rates), there are some differences between the two policies
that could explain the differing results in the synthetic control models. For the “Total Tax
Revenue” models, the differences are more obvious. North Carolina made significant changes to
their corporate income tax system, primarily by lowering their rates, while Utah made no
changes to their corporate tax rates. Corporate income taxes have long been found to be
relatively income elastic (Groves and Kahn 1952), so a lessening dependence on corporate tax
revenue (other things equal) would be expected to result in a lower overall level of revenue
volatility. The second major difference lies in each state’s treatment of the sales tax. North
Carolina largely left the sales tax alone, maintaining the pre-reform statewide rate while
eliminating some minor exemptions and preferential rates (Binker 2013). Utah, on the other
hand, lowered its statewide rate from 4.75 to 4.65 percent and its rate on food to 1.75 percent.
Food is a relatively income inelastic good because its consumption changes relatively little in
proportion to changes in income, so a shrinking reliance on revenue generated from food
consumption would be likely to result in less stable tax revenues. Given that sales tax revenues
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are relatively income inelastic (compared to income taxes) and that North Carolina kept their
reliance on sales tax revenue stable (other things equal) while Utah lessened their reliance on
sales taxes, it is probable that Utah’s policies resulted in higher overall revenue volatility,
relative to that of North Carolina.
The differences between the reforms of North Carolina and Utah that could explain the
different results in the “Individual Income Tax” models are more subtle than the differences
between each state’s treatment of sales taxes and corporate income taxes and largely lie in their
respective reforms of deductions, credits, and exemptions. In North Carolina, the reform
eliminated a number of exemptions and deductions in order to preserve a degree of revenue
neutrality and maintain a broader, more stable tax base. Though they also raised the standard
deduction for individuals, Utah arguably preserved these policies to a such a greater extent that
they could have counteracted other volatility mitigating aspects of their policy. As a result of
their reform, Utah maintained a progressive tax credit that gradually phases out over certain
income thresholds which depend on filing status. Such credits are inherently different from
deductions because they lower tax liability, as opposed to taxable income, by the amount of the
credit and thus may have a more substantial effect on revenue collection than that of deductions,
depending on the size of the credit. Determining the exact effect of North Carolina’s treatment of
deductions, credits and exemptions on subsequent income tax revenue volatility relative to that
of Utah’s reform would require further research, but Cornia, Johnson, and Nelson (2017)
established through simulations using individual tax return data that the system of tax credits
implemented by Utah caused higher revenue volatility than would have been the case had the
state eliminated all deductions, credits, and exemptions.
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Based on these results, future research of tax revenue volatility should further study the
effects of cases tax reform (whether at the local or state-level) in order to determine the likely
causal mechanisms that determine shifts in subsequent revenue volatility. In North Carolina, the
2013 reform broadly appears to have caused a more stable revenue stream for the state.
However, in Utah, the causal effect of the 2007 reform on subsequent revenue volatility is less
clear. The results presented here provide visual evidence only, though statistical evidence is
certainly obtainable. A fixed effects regression model utilizing the volatility measures of each
state’s revenue source (i.e. income tax revenue, total tax revenue, etc.) and its corresponding
synthetic control would produce numerical treatment effects with standard errors which would
determine the statistical significance (or insignificance) of the models just presented.
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Appendix A: North Carolina and Utah Revenues Plotted Against Linear Time Trend
The graphs below plot the values of each of the revenue sources used in the five synthetic
control models in the body of the paper. All graphs plot revenue figures from 2000 to 2017 in
real, 2012 dollars. Each graph also contains a line which plots a linear time trend in order to
compare predicted revenues with actual revenues. The purpose of this is to give context to the
volatility measures presented in the paper, which are calculated as the difference between
predicted and actual revenues as a percentage of total actual revenues.
North Carolina
Figure A.1

North Carolina Income Tax Revenue (thousands of 2012
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Figure A.2

North Carolina Corporate Tax Revenue (thousands of 2012
dollars)
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Figure A.3

North Carolina Total Tax Revenue (thousands of 2012 dollars)
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Utah
Figure A.4

Utah Income Tax Revenue (thousands of 2012 dollars)
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Figure A.5

Utah Total Tax Revenue (thousands of 2012 dollars)
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